Strategy and Tactics
Washington DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1980. First Printing [Stated]. Comb binding. Format is approximately 8.5 inches by 10.5 inches. Stiff card covers. viii, 138 pages. Illustrations. Footnotes. Glossary. Cover has some wear and soiling. Title added to comb sping. RARE first printing. This is one of the U.S. Army Center of Military History Indochina Monographs. This is one of a series published by the U.S. Army Center of Military History. They were written by officers who held responsible positions in the Cambodian, Laotian, and South Vietnamese armed forces during the war in Indochina. The monographs were not edited or altered and reflect the views of their authors--not necessarily those of the U.S. Army or the Department of Defense. The authors were not attempting to write definitive accounts but to set down how they saw the war in Southwest Asia. This monograph endeavors to trace back and evaluate the strategic alternatives at each stage of the war and the evolving tactics employed, with particular emphasis on the period of American withdrawal and reduced support. In the preparation of this monograph, the author has expressed confined the discussion of strategy to its military aspect. While tis conforms to the limited scope of a military subject, the encompassing nature of strategy, especially one conceived to face the enemy's approach to total war, implies that for a better understanding of military strategy, the interplay of social, political, and economic factors should also be brought in as a backdrop. Therefore, wherever appropriate, the author has found it necessary to place strategic discussion in the total war context. More