The Return of Foreign Fighters to Central Asia: Implications for U.S. Counterterrorism Policy; Institute for National Strategic Studies, Strategic Perspectives 21
Washington DC: National Defense University Press, 2016. First Printing [Stated]. Wraps. [6], 33, [1] pages. Map. Tables. Illustrations. Notes. Central Asia is the third largest point of origin for Salafi jihadist foreign fighters in the conflagration in Syria and Iraq, with more than 4,000 total fighters joining the conflict since 2012. As the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant continues to lose territory under duress from U.S.-led anti-ISIL coalition activities, some predict that many may return home bent on jihad and generating terror and instability across Central Asia. Yet several factors indicate that such an ominous foreign fighter return may not materialize. Among these factors are that a majority of Central Asians fighting for ISIL and the al-Nusra Front in Syria and Iraq are recruited while working abroad in Russia, often from low-wage jobs making the recruits ripe for radicalization. Most Central Asian states face their greatest risk of domestic instability and violent extremism as a reaction to political repression policies that counterproductively conflate political opposition and the open practice of Islam with a domestic jihadist threat. Greater U.S. CT assistance to address foreign fighter returns may strengthen illiberal regime short-term focus on political power consolidation, increase the risks of domestic unrest and instability. The United States has few means to pressure Central Asian regimes into policies that address domestic radicalization. U.S. security assistance—and the specific subset of CT assistance—is a significant lever. U.S. CT assistance for Central Asia should eschew additional general lethal assistance and instead scope security attention toward border security intelligence and physical capacity enhancements. More