Report to the President by the Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident, June 6th, 1986; Volume I [ONLY]
Washington, DC: Presidential Commission, 1986. Presumed First Edition, First printing. Wraps. Quarto. [6], 256, [6] pages. Volume I ONLY. Wraps. Illustrations (some color). Tables. Charts. Appendices. References. Slight wear to cover and spine edges. Sticker residue inside front flyleaf. Volume I contains the report and appendices AD. Volumes II and III (not present) contain the rest of the appendices; Volumes IV and V (also not present) contain hearings of the Presidential Commission. The Rogers Commission Report was created by a Presidential Commission charged with investigating the Space Shuttle Challenger disaster during its 10th mission, STS-51-L. The report, released and submitted to President Ronald Reagan on 9 June 1986, both determined the cause of the disaster that took place 73 seconds after liftoff, and urged NASA to improve and install new safety features on the shuttles and in its organizational handling of future missions. One of the commission's members was physicist Richard Feynman. His style of investigating with his own direct methods rather than following the commission schedule put him at odds with Rogers, who commented, "Feynman is becoming a real pain." During a hearing, Feynman famously demonstrated how the O-rings became less resilient and subject to seal failures at ice-cold temperatures by immersing a sample of the material in a glass of ice water. Feynman's own investigation revealed a disconnect between NASA's engineers and executives that was far more striking than he expected. His interviews of NASA's high-ranking managers revealed misunderstandings of elementary concepts. One such concept was the determination of a safety factor. More