SETUP; What the Air Force Did in Vietnam and Why
Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama: Air University Press, 2002. Second Printing [stated]. Wraps. xx, 308 pages. Includes Disclaimer, Foreword, About the Author, Preface, Notes. and Index. Also includes 35 black and white illustrations in the text. Topics covered include In the Time of Atomic Plenty; Situations of a Lesser Magnitude; Rolling Thunder and the Diffusion of Heat; "However Frustrated We Are"; "It was a Loser"; and Completing the Setup. Earl H. Tilford, Jr., was a military officer; historian; professor of history. Born August 17, 1945, St. Petersburg, Florida. Education–University of Alabama, B.A., M.A., 1969; George Washington University, Ph. D., 1984. Served in U.S. Air Force, 1869-89; retired as major. Associate professor of history, Troy State University in Montgomery, 1990-91; professor of military history, U. S. Air Force Command and Staff College, Maxwell Air Force Base; director of research, U. S. Army Strategic Studies Institute; Member American Historical Society, Society for Military History, U. S. Naval Institute. Awarded the Meritorious Service Medal; the Vietnam Cross of Gallantry; the Hoyt S. Vandenburg Award for Educator of the Year, U. S. Air Force,1992. Outside the context of traditional Air Force concepts and hidebound-institutional assumptions, the author provides in this volume the sort of critical self-appraisal of USAF strategy in Vietnam. Tilford is not squeamish about demolishing the myths that abound concerning the air war in Southeast Asia. He is forthright in challenging both the USAF's strategic tunnel vision and the cherished misconceptions of many civilian historians whose criticisms of the air war in Vietnam are long on politics and short on facts. More