Conduct of the Persian Gulf Conflict; An Interim Report to Congress Pursuant to Title V Persian Gulf Conflict, Supplemental Authorization and Personnel Benefits Act of 1991 (Public Law 102-25)
Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, July 1991. Presumed First Edition, First printing. Wraps. Quarto, Various paginations, approximately 275 pages. Wraps. Map. Coalition Forces. Glossary. Appendices. Minor wear to edges, Some soiling to covers and edges. Pursuant to statute, the Department of Defense prepared this Interim Report which reflects many of the preliminary impressions formed by the Department since the cessation of hostilities. It was noted that much of the technical information needed for sound analysis was still being collected and the final report by the Commander-in-Chief of Central Command had not yet been completed. This report presents a unique snapshot understanding of the conflict and the role played by American armed forces. Pursuant to Title V, Public Law 102-25, this report discusses the conduct of hostilities in the Persian Gulf theater of operations. It builds on the Department's Interim Report of July 1991. A proper understanding of the conduct of these military operations the extraordinary achievements and the needed improvements is an important and continuing task of the Department of Defense as we look to the future. The Persian Gulf War was the first major conflict following the end of the Cold War. The victory was a triumph of Coalition strategy, of international cooperation, of technology, and of people. It reflected leadership, patience, and courage at the highest levels and in the field. Under adverse and hazardous conditions, our airmen, soldiers, sailors, and marines once again played the leading role in reversing a dangerous threat to the world and to our national interests. Their skill and sacrifice lie at the heart of this important triumph over aggression. Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait on August 2, 1990, unleashed an extraordinary series of events that culminated seven months later in the victory of American and Coalition forces over the Iraqi army and the liberation of Kuwait.
The evaluation at the end of the conflict was that the Coalition dominated every area of warfare. The seas belonged to the Coalition from the start. Naval units were first on the scene and, along with early deploying air assets, contributed much of our military presence in the early days of the defense of Saudi Arabia. Coalition naval units also enforced United Nations economic sanctions against Iraq by inspecting ships and, when necessary, diverting them away from Iraq and Kuwait. This maritime interception effort was the start of the military cooperation among the Coalition members, and helped to deprive Iraq of outside resupply and revenues. The early arrival of the Marine Corps' Maritime Prepositioning Force provided an important addition to our deterrent on the ground. The Coalition controlled the skies virtually from the beginning of the air war, freeing our ground and naval units from air attack and preventing the Iraqis from using aerial reconnaissance to detect the movements of Coalition ground forces. Tactical aircraft were on the ground and the 82nd Airborne Division's Ready Brigade had been airlifted to the theater within hours of the order to deploy. Coalition planes destroyed 41 Iraqi aircraft and helicopters in air-to-air combat without suffering a confirmed loss to Iraqi aircraft. Coalition air power crippled Iraqi command and control and known unconventional weapons production, severely degraded the combat effectiveness of Iraqi forces, and paved the way for the final land assault that swept Iraqi forces from the field in only 100 hours. In the course of flying more than 100,000 sorties the Coalition lost only 38 fixed-wing aircraft. On the ground, Coalition armored forces traveled over 250 miles in 100 hours, one of the fastest movements of armored forces in the history of combat, to execute the now famous "left hook" that enveloped Iraq's elite, specially trained and equipped
Republican Guards. Shortly after the end of the war, the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) estimated that Iraq lost roughly 3,800 tanks to Coalition air and ground attack; U.S. combat tank losses were fifteen.
This interim report responded to 25 numbered and one lettered Congressional questions. Condition: Good.
Keywords: Desert Storm, Persian Gulf War, Special Operations, Logistics, Saddam Hussein, Dick Cheney, Saudi Arabia, Coalition Warfare, Military Strategy, Military Logistics, Airlift, Sealift, Maritime Prepositioning, Military Operations, Personnel Management
ISBN: 0160358957
[Book #19953]
Price: $150.00