The U.S. Government and the Vietnam War: Executive and Legislative Roles and Relationships, Part II, 1961-1964
Washington, DC: GPO, 1985. Wraps. 424 pages. Part II only, map, footnotes, appendix, notes on sources, index, some wear and soiling to covers and spine. xiii, [1], 424, [2] pages. Vol. 2 only. Wraps. Map. Footnotes. Appendix. Notes on Sources and Style. Index. Slight wear and soiling to covers. "This is a study of U.S. government policymaking during the 30 years of the Vietnam war, 1945-75, beginning with the 1945-1960 period. Although focusing on the course of events in Washington and between Washington and U.S. officials on the scene, it also depicts major events and trends in Vietnam to which the U.S. was responding, as well as the state of American public opinion and public activity directed at supporting or opposing the war."--Preface from Volume I. Volume 2 of a five-volume study prepared for the Committee on Foreign Relations of the U.S. Senate on the formulation of Vietnam policy during the Kennedy and Johnson administrations. This second volume begins with the inauguration of President John F. Kennedy, and continues through President Lyndon B. Johnson's first year in office. During these four years, the U.S. commitment was expanded, and the number of American military personnel in Vietnam rose from 800 to almost 20,000. This document was prepared for the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations by the Congressional Research Service of the Library of Congress. S. Prt. 98-185, Pt. 2. Summary of the contents: Chapter 1 THE 1961 DECISION TO STAND FIRM IN VIETNAM (pp. 1-71) By 1961, after years of U.S. support for existing governments in Vietnam and Laos, the Communists appeared to be making greater inroads in those countries, and it seemed clear to U.S. policymakers that further action needed to be taken to protect American interests in Southeast Asia. In Vietnam, the government of Ngo Dinh Diem was becoming increasingly unpopular, while being faced with more intense military and political pressures from the Communists. In November 1960, the Communists, together with some of the non-Communists who opposed the Diem government, organized a new political action group, the National Liberation Front. Chapter 2 THE NEW U.S. COMMITMENT: “LIMITED PARTNERS” (pp. 72-136) General Taylor and his party left for Vietnam on October 17, 1961, stopping at Honolulu to confer with Adm. Harry D. Felt, the U.S. Commander in Chief, Pacific (CINCPAC). Felt recommended against deploying U.S. forces in Vietnam “until we have exhausted other means for helping Diem.” He was concerned that the use of U.S. forces would raise the colonialist issue, spur the Communists into greater action, and eventually involve U.S. troops in extended combat. He agreed, however, that the U.S. had to play a stronger role in Vietnam, and thought that SEATO forces might eventually be required in Laos. Chapter 3 SOWING THE WIND: THE FALL OF NGO DINH DIEM (pp. 137-208) By the end of 1962, there were about 11,500 U.S. military personnel in Vietnam compared to about 3,000 at the beginning of that year, and their role, as well as the numbers and role of other U.S. personnel, had expanded sharply. Yet, as the CIA had correctly predicted in November 1961 during debate on the Taylor-Rostow report, there also seems to have been an equal or greater increase in Communist forces and activity. President Kennedy, who had received very little solace from Mansfield or from Forrestal and Hilsman, had reason to wonder whether the new U.S.-Vietnamese partnership was succeeding o not. Chapter 4 PREPARING FOR THE POSSIBILITY OF A WIDER WAR (pp. 209-279) On November 24, 1963, two days after becoming President, Lyndon Johnson met with Lodge, Rusk, McNamara, Ball, McCone, and McGeorge Bundy to discuss Vietnam. (This followed a meeting on Vietnam held in Honolulu on November 20, which was attended by all top-level U.S. officials from Washington and Saigon.) Lodge was optimistic. McCone reported that there had been a considerable increase in Communist activity, and that he “could see no basis for an optimistic forecast of the future.” Johnson said he had “serious misgivings” about the situation, but that the U.S. had to persevere. Chapter 5 STRIKING BACK: THE GULF OF TONKIN INCIDENTS (pp. 280-342) During the latter part of June and continuing through July 1964, the U.S. proceeded to carry out various of the military measures outlined in the June 15 White House memo which had been approved by the top members of the NSC and by the President. The Pentagon Papers provides a good summary of these actions: Among the more important military-political actions, carried out with considerable publicity, were the accelerated military construction effort in Thailand and South Vietnam, the prepositioning of contingency stockpiles in Thailand and the Philippines, including the forward deployment of a carrier task force and land-based tactical aircraft. Chapter 6 TALKING PEACE AND PLANNING WAR (pp. 343-402) Immediately after the U.S. reprisal against North Vietnam on August 5, 1964, the U.S. resumed the DE SOTO patrols in the Gulf of Tonkin. At about 1:30 a.m. on August 5 (Vietnam time), prior to the retaliatory raids later that night, the order was given by CINCPAC for the patrol to resume at daylight. The Maddox and the Turner Joy did so, but later that day they were ordered to stop for rest and replenishment. It is not clear when or whether they resumed their patrol, but a short time later CINCPAC requested authority to conduct still another patrol. APPENDIX: Legal Commentary and Judicial Opinions on the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution (pp. 403-412). Condition: good.
Keywords: Vietnam War, Indochina, John F. Kennedy, Lyndon B. Johnson, Politics and Government, Gulf of Tonkin, Ngo Dinh Diem, Foreign Relations, McGeorge Bundy, Counterinsurgency, Fulbright, Maxwell Taylor, McNamara-Taylor Mission, NSAM 288, Honolulu Conferenc
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