Expectations for the US Nuclear Stockpile Stewardship Program
Washington, DC: Panel to Assess Reliability, 2002. Presumed First Edition, First printing. Wraps. quarto, 30 pages, wraps, footnotes, figures, appendix. Subtitled: FY2001 Report to Congress of the Panel to Assess the Reliability, Safety, and Security of the United States Nuclear Stockpile. This report focussed on a narrow question: is there a technical issue that necessitates a return to nuclear testing? In order to meet the growing technical challenges of stockpile stewardship, the Panel recommended that Presidential guidance be revised to require a balanced and complete assessment of the stockpile, the nuclear weapons complex that supports it, and the alternative options available for sustaining confidence. The Panel urges Congress to continue its strong focus and leadership, particularly in the following four areas: First, there is significant potential to strengthen stockpile surveillance, assessments, and certification. These processes are the day-to-day foundation for understanding and investigating the issues associated with stockpile safety and reliability, and they should be as rigorous and probing as the responsible stockpile stewards know how to make them. Congress should encourage the proposed revisions to these processes, which are needed to obtain a balanced and complete assessment of stewardship issues and options.
Second, we need to articulate and fund a balanced, forward-looking weapons program that meets the requirements for weapons refurbishments, explores advanced concepts, and maintains leading-edge capabilities in weapons-relevant science and technology. A renewed and sharpened focus on deliverable products will drive the need to restore the weapons complex, to train a new generation of stockpile stewards, and to address long-standing management deficiencies.
Third, test readiness, the time required to conduct a test after a decision to test is made, must be addressed much more realistically. This is not because a need to test is imminent, but because prudence requires that every President have a realistic option to test, in a timely manner, should technical or political events dictate a requirement.
Fourth, the coming year will be critical for determining whether the NNSA can provide the strong leadership Congress sought by establishing this organization in 1999. The Secretary of Energy has limited the oversight of NNSA by DOE’s environmental, safety, and health organization. However, he should also be urged to do still more to remove staff activities in DOE headquarters that are redundant to functions in NNSA. Such redundant activities inevitably hamper the efficient pursuit of NNSA’s mission. NNSA must lead in transforming the weapons program by creating a resource plan that
explains how it will address the challenges of stockpile stewardship, and in establishing the management capable of executing the plan. If NNSA is unable to accomplish such tasks within the current year, Congress should take positive action to further strengthen the mandate and support needed to adequately manage the national nuclear weapons program. Condition: Very Good.
Keywords: Nuclear Stockpile, NNSA, Nuclear Weapons, Stewardship, Nuclear Testing, Weapon Assessment, Surveillance, Weapons Program, Signed
[Book #52160]
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