Washington, DC: U. S. Government Printing Office, 2005. Presumed first edition/first printing. Wraps. With the companion CD present in back pocket. , xxxviii, 660 pages. Front cover has folding flap with text. Footnotes. Fold-out. Maps. Illustrations. This was prepared under the auspices of David F. Gordon, Vice Chairman, National Intelligence Council. This is a historic collection of intelligence documents related to the Vietnam War. It contains 38 documents with an additional 174 in the companion CD. These document show how the U.S. Intelligence Community viewed critical developments over a 27-year period, ranging from analysis of the breakup of colonial empires to the Communist takeover of Saigon in 1975. From Wikipedia: "The National Intelligence Council (NIC) is the center for midterm and long-term strategic thinking within the United States Intelligence Community (IC). It was formed in 1979. According to its official website: It leads the IC's effort to produce National Intelligence Estimates and other documents; It supports (and reports to) the Director of National Intelligence; It serves as a focal point for policymakers' questions; It contributes to the effort to allocate IC resources in response to policy changes; and It communicates with experts in academia and the private sector to broaden the IC's perspective; The NIC's goal is to provide policymakers with the best information: unvarnished, unbiased and without regard to whether the analytic judgments conform to current U.S. policy." The National Intelligence Council (NIC) is delighted to publish this historic collection of intelligence documents related to the Vietnam War. The documents—38 in this book and 174 in the companion CD—show how the US intelligence Community viewed critical developments over a 27-year period, ranging from analysis of the implications of the post-World War II breakup of colonial empires to the Communist takeover of Saigon in 1975. A number of these documents were declassified and published in other circumstances, but many are being made public here for the first time. As such, they undoubtedly will be of immense interest and value to historians and scholars, academics and diplomats, and comprise in sum a unique historical record of a challenging and controversial chapter in US foreign relations. The documents are estimative intelligence products, that is, reports that projected the impact of current trends into the future to give policymakers and military commanders a heads-up about where events were likely to lead and their probable impact on US security interests. Because they reflected the careful scrutiny and final agreement on conclusions by various Intelligence Community analysts and agencies, they were considered the most authoritative assessments of the Intelligence Community. The documents fall into two broad categories: 1) formal products of the national intelligence estimative process, and 2) memoranda put out unilaterally by Office of National Estimates (ONE). The most important difference in the two categories is that the products of the formal process—mostly National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs) or Special National Intelligence Estimates (SNIEs)—were coordinated with the constituent agencies of what is now known as the Intelligence Community while the ONE memoranda for the most part were not. Importantly, however, both the formal products and substantive ONE memoranda in the collection were written for and disseminated to the highest levels of policymaking, including in many cases the President. Few of the ONE memoranda have been declassified before, and many of the NIEs and SNIEs published between the late 1960s and 1975 have not been previously released. Condition: Very good.
Keywords: Indochina, Dien Bien Phu, National Intelligence Estimate, Communism, Domino Theory, Cambodia, Intelligence Community, Intelligence Assessments