The Regulation of Nuclear Trade; Non-Proliferation--Supply--Safety: Volume I, International Aspects, Volume II, National Regulations.

Paris: Nuclear Energy Agency, 1988. Presumed first edition/first printing thus. Trade paperback. Two volume set. Volume I ISBN is 9264131205 and Volume II ISBN is 9264131213. 262 pages and 325 pages. Notes and References. Name of former owner on each title page. Cover has wear and soiling. This study is in two parts. Volume I covers the international aspects of regulation of trade in nuclear materials and equipment and of technology transfers. It analyses international rules and directives on nuclear trade, in particular on non-proliferation, supply and physical protection of nuclear materials, and on safety and radiation protection. Some of the most significant texts are reproduced. In addition, the role and statutory functions of the different appropriate international organizations are described and bilateral agreements concluded in this field are reviewed. Volume II analyses the legislation in various OECD Member countries on trade in nuclear materials and equipment and on technology transfers. It describes the regulations concerning non-proliferation, physical protection of nuclear materials and radiation protection, and covers general regulations on foreign trade as well as agreements concluded in that field. Before U.S. companies can obtain an export license for nuclear equipment or materials, the United States must conclude a bilateral agreement for civil nuclear trade, or Section 123 agreement. The purpose of these agreements is to prevent diversion of U.S. commercial nuclear materials, components and technology from their intended peaceful use.
The United States has Section 123 agreements in place with 22 countries, Euratom (which includes 27 member countries), the International Atomic Energy Agency and Taiwan. Many of these agreements are scheduled to expire by 2015. These expiring agreements include major nuclear trading partners like China. Timely renewal of these agreements is critical to continuation of nuclear trade between U.S. firms and firms in these nations.
Many nations that are developing new nuclear programs do not have a Section 123 agreement with the United States, which closes the market to American businesses. Meanwhile, foreign suppliers are actively pursuing nuclear project development in these countries. For example, Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Malaysia—all with interest in expanding nuclear energy—do not have 123 agreements with the United States and, consequently, these markets are not open to U.S. exporters.

The U.S. is a member of various multilateral nonproliferation regimes, including:

Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) - With 39 member states, the NSG is a widely accepted, mature, and effective export-control arrangement which contributes to the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons through implementation of guidelines for control of nuclear and nuclear-related exports.
Zangger Committee - The purpose of the 35-nation Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) Exporters (Zangger) Committee is to harmonize implementation of the NPT requirements to apply International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards to nuclear exports. The Committee maintains and updates a list of equipment and materials that may only be exported if safeguards are applied to the recipient facility (called the "Trigger List" because such exports trigger the requirement for safeguards).
Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) - The 34 MTCR partners have committed to apply a common export policy (MTCR Guidelines) to a common list of controlled items, including all key equipment and technology needed for missile development, production, and operation. MTCR Guidelines restrict transfers of missiles - and technology related to missiles - for the delivery of WMD. The regime places particular focus on missiles capable of delivering a payload of at least 500 kg with a range of at least 300 km -- so-called "Category I" or "MTCR-class" missiles.
Australia Group (AG) - Objective is to ensure that the industries of the thirty-eight participating countries do not assist, either purposefully or inadvertently, states or terrorists seeking to acquire a chemical and/or biological weapons (CBW) capability.
Wassenaar Arrangement (WA) - The regime with the most extensive set of control lists; it seeks to prevent destabilizing accumulations of arms and dual-use equipment and technologies that may contribute to the development or enhancement of military capabilities that would undermine regional security and stability, and to develop mechanisms for information sharing among the 34 partners as a way to harmonize export control practices and policies.
Condition: Good.

Keywords: Nonproliferation, Nuclear Technology, Export Control, Technology Transfer, Nuclear Material, EURATOM, COCOM, Co-Ordinating Committee on Export Controls, Radiation Protection, Transport of Radioactive Materials, Nuclear Installations., Licensing Syste

[Book #72366]

Price: $75.00