The Air Offensive Against Germany
London: British Information Services, 1941. Presumed First Edition, First printing. Wraps. Format is approximately 8 inches by 13 inches. Item has been folded in half. Ex-library with the usual library markings. Library accessed this document on July 21 1941. Scarce surviving copy. 28 pages plus covers. Maps. Illustrations. Inside the front cover is a multi-colored map that shows the scope of the Air Offensive (going to the east of Berlin) and identifies Munition Works/Power Stations, Aerodromes or Seaplane Bases, Aircraft Works, Oil, Railways, Docks & Waterways, German Navy, The Ruhr, and other Various Objectives. The size of the red bomb symbol indicated either one or ten attacks. Another map, and enlargement of the area of the Ruhr from the front cover map, is inside the rear cover. Stapled to the back cover is one sheet, approximately 7.5 inches by 9.5 inches entitled Details of Additional Attacks, from the night of February 1st 1941 to April 15 1941. For attacks subsequent to 1st February 1941, the information in this document appears to have been derived from Air Ministry Communiqués Nos. 2899 and onwards. Starting on page 5 is a list of the major bombing attacks carried out by the Royal Air Force over German territory between the outbreak of the war, 3rd of September, 1939 and the 1st of February, 1941, as reported in communiqués issued by the Air Ministry. The details are printed primarily in a two column format. The information provided includes the area attacked, date of attack, and objectives bombed. Author/publisher not listed but derived through bibliographic research. This work is self-described as a brochure. The map presented inside the front cover apparently was also issued separately as a War Poster.
Strategic bombing during World War II was the sustained aerial attack on railways, harbours, cities, workers' and civilian housing, and industrial districts in enemy territory during World War II. Strategic bombing is a military strategy which is distinct from both close air support of ground forces and tactical air power.
During World War II, it was believed by many military strategists of air power that major victories could be won by attacking industrial and political infrastructure, rather than purely military targets. Strategic bombing often involved bombing areas inhabited by civilians and some campaigns were deliberately designed to target civilian populations in order to terrorize and disrupt their usual activities. International law at the outset of World War II did not specifically forbid aerial bombardment of cities despite the prior occurrence of such bombing during World War I, the Spanish Civil War, and the Second Sino-Japanese War.
Strategic bombing during World War II began on 1 September 1939 when Germany invaded Poland and the Luftwaffe (German Air Force) began bombing cities and the civilian population in Poland in an indiscriminate aerial bombardment campaign.[21] As the war continued to expand, bombing by both the Axis and the Allies increased significantly. The Royal Air Force began bombing military targets in Germany, such as docks and shipyards, in March 1940. In September 1940, the Luftwaffe began targeting British cities in the Blitz. From February 1942 onward, the British bombing campaign against Germany became less restrictive and increasingly targeted industrial sites and eventually, civilian areas. When the United States began flying bombing missions against Germany, it reinforced these efforts and controversial firebombings were carried out against Hamburg (1943), Dresden (1945), and other German cities. The effect of strategic bombing was highly debated during and after the war.[28][29][30][31] Both the Luftwaffe and RAF failed to deliver a knockout blow by destroying enemy morale. However, some argued that strategic bombing of non-military targets could significantly reduce enemy industrial capacity and production and in the opinion of its interwar period proponents, the surrender of Japan vindicated strategic bombing.
Operation Abigail Rachel was the bombing of Mannheim the "first deliberate terror raid" on Germany on 16 December. The British had been waiting for the opportunity to experiment with such a raid aimed at creating a maximum of destruction in a selected town since the summer of 1940, and the opportunity was given after the German raid on Coventry. Internally it was declared to be a reprisal for Coventry and Southampton. The new bombing policy was officially ordered by Churchill at the start of December, on condition it receive no publicity and be considered an experiment. Target marking and most bombs missed the city centre. This led to the development of the bomber stream. Despite the lack of decisive success of this raid, approval was granted for further Abigails.
This was the start of a British drift away from precision attacks on military targets and towards area bombing attacks on whole cities. During the first few months of the area bombing campaign, an internal debate within the British government about the most effective use of the nation's limited resources in waging war on Germany continued. Should the Royal Air Force (RAF) be scaled back to allow more resources to go to the British Army and Royal Navy or should the strategic bombing option be followed and expanded? An influential paper was presented to support the bombing campaign by Professor Frederick Lindemann, the British government's leading scientific adviser, justifying the use of area bombing to "dehouse" the German workforce as the most effective way of reducing their morale and affecting enemy war production. Condition: Fair.
Keywords: Royal Air Force, Air Offensive, Strategic Bombing, Aerial Operations, Air Ministry, Ruhr, Industrial Targets, Military Targets
[Book #79991]
Price: $100.00