Lee, Grant and Sherman; A Study in Leadership in the 1864-65 Campaign
Aldershot: Gale & Polden, Limited, 1938. Presumed First Edition, First printing. Hardcover. xv, [1], 216 pages. DJ has wear, tears, chips, and soiling. Note inserted at page 7 indicates all maps face north. Half page Corrigenda insert at page 1. Frontis illustration. Maps (some with color, many folding, including large folding map in rear pocket). Footnotes. Chronological Table. Index. Stamps inside front cover and on title page indicate that this copy was for the use of His Majesty's Forces. DJ has wear, soiling, and is price clipped. Explanatory Note. Bibliographical Note. The title of this book was suggested by the fate that three notable books, each written by a military expert, had recently been published in England on Lee, Grant, and Sherman. The author was referring to Robert E. Lee, The Soldier by General Sir Frederick Maurice, Grant and Lee by General J. F. C. Fuller, and Sherman by Captain Liddell Hart. Each general in turn is held up to our admiration, yet obviously all three cannot be equally admired, and it was the aim of this work to try and strike a balance between the rival protagonists. The author cast this study in the form of an outline of events in the campaign of 1864-65, with a commentary at the end of each phase. Sections have been included on the little-studied but strictly relevant and illuminating campaigns of Generals Hood and Early. A Chronological Table was provided at the end and was designed to convey to the eye a swift and proportionate picture of the whole vase war-theatre of the '64-'65 Campaign. Alfred Higgins Burne DSO (1886–1959) was a soldier and military historian. He invented the concept of Inherent Military Probability; in battles and campaigns where there is some doubt over what action was taken, Burne believed that the action taken would be one which a trained staff officer of the twentieth century would take. Alfred Burne was educated at Winchester School and RMA Woolwich, before being commissioned into the Royal Artillery in 1906. He was awarded the DSO during the First World War and, during World War II, was Commandant of the 121st Officer Cadet Training Unit. He retired as a Lieutenant-Colonel. He was Military Editor of Chambers Encyclopedia from 1938 to 1957 and became an authority on the history of land warfare. He was a contributor to the Oxford Dictionary of National Biography. Burne introduced the concept of Inherent Military Probability (IMP) to the study of military history. He himself defined it thus: My method here is to start with what appear to be undisputed facts, then to place myself in the shoes of each commander in turn, and to ask myself in each case what I would have done. This I call working on Inherent Military Probability. I then compare the resulting action with the existing record in order to see whether it discloses any incompatibility with the existing facts. If not, I then go on to the next debatable or obscure point in the battle and repeat the operation More succinctly, John Keegan defined IMP as The solution of an obscurity by an estimate of what a trained soldier would have done in the circumstances. Had Lee enjoyed the manpower or materiel advantages of Grant, would the South have triumphed? Had Hood possessed strength superior to Sherman's, would he still have lost their encounters in Georgia? Popular sentiment has long bowed to the military leadership of the Civil War's victorious generals—a view that has been disputed by modern scholarship. Many might be startled to learn that a British army officer also called these opinions into question long ago. Lee, Grant and Sherman is an unrecognized classic of Civil War history that presaged current scholarship by decades. Alfred H. Burne assesses the military leadership of Grant, Lee, Sherman, Hood, Johnston, Early, and Sheridan from mid-1864 to Appomattox, contradicting prevailing perceptions of the generals and even proposing that Grant's military capabilities were inferior to Lee's.
Burne sought to challenge the orthodox views of other historians—J. F. C. Fuller on Grant and Basil Liddell Hart on Sherman—but his assessments were so unorthodox that even with the endorsement of preeminent Civil War historian Douglas Southall Freeman, his book received scant attention in its day. He sees Sherman as more concerned with the geographical objective of capturing Atlanta than the military goal of smashing the Confederate army, lacking Grant's understanding that the principal object of war is to conquer and destroy the enemy's armed forces. Yet he asserts that "Grant in his heart of hearts feared Lee" and also suggests that Jubal Early's Valley campaign might have been the most brilliant of the whole war. Refusing to dismiss Hood as incompetent, as many historians have done, Burne points to his brilliance in military planning and claims that most of his defeats were merely the result of inadequate resources. Burne's book was ahead of its time, anticipating later shifts in historical evaluations of Civil War leadership. Condition: Good / Good.
Keywords: Robert E. Lee, Ulysses Grant, William Tecumseh Sherman, Civil War, Battle of the Wilderness, Spottsylvania, North Anna, Cold Harbor, Atlanta Campaign, Rescaca, Cassville, Etowah, Chattahoochee, John Bell Hood, Jonesborough, Jubal Early, Shenadoah, Pe
[Book #82960]
Price: $175.00