The Great Debate; Theories of Nuclear Strategy

Elliott Erwitt (Author photograph) Garden City, NY: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1965. American Edition. Presumed first printing thus. Hardcover. ix, [5], 265, [9] pages. Footnotes. DJ has some wear and soiling. Includes Preface to the American Edition, as well as chapters on Fifteen Years of Technological Revolution, 1945-60; The Strategic Theory Takes Shape; Europe and the McNamara Doctrine; The Independent French Deterent; The Future of the Atlantic Alliance; Logic and Paradoxes of the Strategic Theory; and Final Considerations. This book grew out of a course on the influence of nuclear weapons on international relations that Raymond Aron taught at the Institut d"etudes politiques in 1962-63. The book ends with a chapter on Final Considerations. In that final chapter the author tries to look ahead to four variables governing the future of the game of deterrence: The number of countries possessing atomic or thermonuclear weapons; The qualitative arms race, the possible political developments, involving either a realignment of nations, and the consistency or inconsistency of strategic doctrines. Originally written to explain the U.S. position to the French, the book is equally valuable for explaining it to Americans. Finally, and perhaps most vital ,Aron points out where Americans and Europeans have misinterpreted each other's views, and separates the unnecessary confusion from the real issues at stake for the Western allies. Raymond Claude Ferdinand Aron (14 March 1905 – 17 October 1983) was a French philosopher, sociologist, political scientist and journalist, one of the country's most prominent thinkers of the 20th century. Aron is best known for his 1955 book The Opium of the Intellectuals, the title of which inverts Karl Marx's claim that religion was the opium of the people; he argues that Marxism was the opium of the intellectuals in post-war France. In the book, Aron chastised French intellectuals for what he described as their harsh criticism of capitalism and democracy and their simultaneous defense of Marxist oppression, atrocities and intolerance. Critic Roger Kimball suggests that Opium is "a seminal book of the twentieth century". Aron is also known for his lifelong friendship, sometimes fractious, with philosopher Jean-Paul Sartre. The saying "Better be wrong with Sartre than right with Aron" became popular among French intellectuals. As a voice of moderation in politics, Aron had many disciples on both the political left and right, but he remarked that he personally was "more of a left-wing Aronian than a right-wing one." Aron wrote extensively on a wide range of other topics. Citing the breadth and quality of Aron's writings, historian James R. Garland suggests, "Though he may be little known in America, Raymond Aron arguably stood as the preeminent example of French intellectualism for much of the twentieth century". In the field of international relations in the 1950s, Aron hypothesized that despite the advent of nuclear weapons, nations would still require conventional military forces. The usefulness of such forces would be made necessary by what he called a "nuclear taboo." This topical volume delineates the French position on thermonuclear weapons, as well as outlines the theories of deterrence and graduated retaliation that have guided U.S. nuclear policy formation. Also examines the future of the Atlantic Alliance. Political scientists, scientists and nuclear strategists will find this text an invaluable aid in understanding the issues that both unite and divide the Western allies on the issue of nuclear arms. Condition: Very Good / Good.

Keywords: Nuclear Weapons, Nuclear Strategy, NATO, Atlantic Alliance, Military Technology, Strategic Theory, McNamara Doctrine, Deterrence

[Book #83051]

Price: $100.00