The German Campaign In Russia: Planning and Operations (1940-1942); Department of the Army Pamphlet, No. 20-261a
Washington DC: Department of the Army, March, 1955. Presumed First Edition, First printing. Hardcover--Library style binding. viii, 187, [1] pages. This appears to have been originally produced in softcover/wraps and subsequently rebound in library style binding with lettering on the spine. Original covers were not retained. Contains as well as 17 Maps and 5 Charts, some folding. Includes Foreword, as well as Part One. Planning; Part Two. Operations in 1941; Part 3, 1942--The Year of Indecision. Also contains Appendixes, Chronology of Events, and Bibliographical Note. The purpose of this study is to describe German planning and operations in the first part of the campaign again Russia. The narrative starts with Hitler's initial plans for an invasion of Russia and ends at the time of Germany's maximum territorial gains during the battle for Stalingrad. The material for this study was obtained from German military records ow in the custody of The Adjutant General, Department of the Army. Monographs by former German general officers who had an active part in the planning and operations provided additional information. The authors of those monographs included: Franz Halder, and Gotthard Heinrici. The study was written by George E. Blau of the Special Studies Division, Office of the Chief of Military History. In his presentation, the author made every effort to give an objective account of Germany's initial efforts to conquer Soviet Russia in World War II. The pamphlet number has an 'a' because a second volume, depicting the course of events from the Russian counteroffensive in November 1942 until the capture of Berlin in April 1945 was be prepared and would be issued with a 'b'. Clausewitz observed of Russia that "it was a country which could be subdued only by its own weakness and by the effects of internal dissension. In order to strike these vulnerable spots of its body politic, Russia would have to be agitated at the very center." In reading this study, the military student will realize how dearly the Germans had to pay for ignoring Clausewitz's advice. On the basis of data provided by Kinzel on 26 July, Halder concluded that an attack launched from assembly areas in East Prussia and northern Poland toward Moscow would offer the best chances for success. After the seizure of Moscow the Russian forces defending the Ukraine and the Black Sea coast would be compelled to fight a series of battles with reversed front. The first draft of the Operations Division plan placed the main effort south of the Pripyat Marshes. The plan also called for 100 divisions. Halder, however, preferred to place the main effort north of the Pripyat. Two days later, 29 July, Generalmajor (Brig. Gen.) Erich Marcks was temporarily assigned to Army High Command headquarters to draw up a campaign plan against the Soviet Union. General Marcks was chief of staff of the Eighteenth Army, which had recently been assigned to the Russian border and was preparing plans for defense against a possible Russian attack. On 31 July, toward the end of a conference at Berchtesgaden that was mainly concerned with Operation SEELOEWE, Hitler declared that a showdown with Russia would have to take place the following spring. The quicker the USSR was defeated, the better. The entire campaign made sense only if the Soviet Union was smashed in one fell swoop: territorial gains alone would prove unsatisfactory, and stopping the offensive during the winter months might be dangerous. Therefore, it was best to wait until May 1941 and then bring the campaign to a successful conclusion within five months. Condition: Good.
Keywords: Marcks Plan, BARBAROSSA, Raeder, Military Exercises, Army Group South, Red Army, Military Logistics, Stalingrad, Caucasus, Order of Battle, Military Leadership, Military Planning, Combat Operations, Chain of Command
[Book #83053]
Price: $175.00