Report to Congress on Stockpile Reliability, Weapon Remanufacture, and The Role of Nuclear Testing; UCRL-53822

Livermore, CA: Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, 1987. Presumed First Edition, First printing. Wraps. iii, [1], 59, [1] pages. Figure. Table. Ink notation on the front cover. The contents include: Abstract, Executive Summary, The Need for Nuclear Testing, History of Stockpile Problems and Post-Deployment Nuclear Testing, Weapon Remanufacture, Preparing for Further Nuclear Test Limitations, Acknowledgments, References, Appendix A. Letter from Congressmen Les Aspin, N. D. Dicks, D. B. Fascell, E. J. Markey, J. M. Spratt, and Senator E. M. Kennedy to Director Roger Batzel, dated March 30, 1987; Appendix B. Letter from Director Roger Batzel to Congressman Les Aspin, dated April 17, 1987; Appendix C. The Polaris A3 and the Saturn V Remanufacture Experiences; Appendix D. Materials Science and Engineering Considerations in Weapon Manufacture; and Appendix E. Senate Armed Services Committee Language for the FY 1988 Authorization Bill. George H. Miller Ph.D. served as director of the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) from 2007 until 2011. Dr. Miller received his B.S. with high honors in physics in 1967, his M.S. in physics in 1969 and his Ph.D. in physics in 1972, all from the College of William and Mary. Dr. Miller joined the LLNL staff in 1972, as a physicist. In 1985, he became associate director for nuclear design. He left LLNL in 1989, to serve as the special scientific adviser on weapons activities to the U.S. Department of Energy. In 1990 he returned to LLNL to serve as associate director for defense and nuclear technologies, associate director for national security, and associate director for National Ignition Facility programs. This report has been prepared in response to a request from Congressmen L. Aspin, N. D. Dicks, D. B. Fascell, E. J. Markey, and J. M. Spratt, and Senator E. M. Kennedy, to Dr. Roger Batzel, the Director of the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL). Dr. Batzel was asked to make Dr. Ray Kidder available to study two issues: (1) "whether past warhead reliability problems demonstrate that nuclear explosive testing is needed to identify or to correct stockpile reliability," or (2) "whether a program of stockpile inspection, nonnuclear testing, and remanufacture would be sufficient to deal with stockpile reliability problems." In his response, Dr. Batzel indicated that Dr. Kidder would be available to perform the requested study, and that materials would be made available to him for his review. Dr. Batzel also indicated that Dr. George Miller, Associate Director for Defense Systems at LLNL, would prepare a separate report analyzing the issues. This report presents the findings of Dr. Miller and his coauthors. Chapter 1 examines the reasons for nuclear testing. Although the thrust of the request from Congressman Aspin et al., has to do with the need for nuclear testing as it relates to stockpile reliability and remanufacture, there are other very important reasons for nuclear testing. Since there has been increasing interest in the U.S. Congress for more
restrictive nuclear test limits, we have addressed the overall need for nuclear testing and the potential impact of further nuclear test limitations. Chapter 1 also summarizes the major conclusions of a recent study conducted by the Scientific and Academic Advisory Committee (SAAC) for the President of the University of California; the SAAC report is entitled, "Nuclear Weapon Tests: The Role of the University of California-Department of Energy Laboratories." The SAAC spent many days at LLNL and LANL in direct discussions with numerous experienced weapon design personnel. They received classified briefings and read classified material on the subjects of weapon reliability, the role of nuclear testing, and the measures the Laboratories have been taking to prepare for further nuclear test limitations. There was much interchange and discussion on these topics. The depth of the SAAC study far exceeds that of any other independent review of these topics. Chapter 2 presents a brief history of stockpile problems that involved post-deployment nuclear testing for their resolution. Chapter 3 addresses the problems involved in remanufacturing nuclear weapons, and Chapter 4 discusses measures that should be taken to prepare for possible future restrictive test limits.
Condition: Good.

Keywords: Nuclear Weapons, Stockpile Reliability, Weapon Remanufacture, Nuclear Testing, Underground Nuclear, Weapon Reliability, Test Limitations, Arms Control, Polaris A3, Saturn V, Post-Deployment Testing, Material Aging, Weapon Aging, Weapon Safety, Weapon

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