Military Persuasion; Deterrence and Provocation in Crisis and War
University Park, Pennsylvania: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1994. Presumed First Edition, First printing. Hardcover. x, 307, [3] pages. Footnotes. Tables. Ex-library with the usual library markings. Contents include Introduction; Mobilization, Deterrence, and Conciliation; U.S. Nuclear Strategic Planning for World War III; The Opening Phase of War; Coercion in War and Diplomacy; Fighting and Ending Wars on Terms; Conclusion, and Index. Stephen J. Cimbala is a Distinguished Professor of Political Science at Penn State Brandywine, and is the author of numerous books and articles in the fields of international security studies, defense policy, nuclear weapons and arms control, intelligence and other fields. He is a graduate of Penn State, having received his B.A. in Journalism in 1965. He received an M.A. in 1967 and his Ph.D. in 1969, both in Political Science from the University of Wisconsin at Madison. He serves on the editorial boards of various professional journals, has consulted for a number of U.S. government agencies and defense contractors, and is frequently quoted in the media on national security topics. Dr. Cimbala has taught courses in international relations, comparative politics, national security policy, U.S. intelligence, political thought and other topics. He is a past recipient of Penn State's Eisenhower Award for teaching excellence. He is a member of Penn State's graduate faculty. As a chief academic officer of the Delaware County campus from 1973-1981 and from 1987-1988, Cimbala was responsible for all matters related to faculty and academic programs. In Military Persuasion, Stephen J. Cimbala reconciles two central approaches to war and peace studies. In the study of crisis management and war termination, the security literature overwhelmingly emphasizes the making of credible deterrent threats and coercive bargaining, while peace studies and conflict resolution literature focuses on conciliation and the offering of acceptable terms prior to or during a conflict. Cimbala contends that both threats and accommodation have their place in successfully preventing and ending conflicts.
Military Persuasion is particularly welcome in the 1990s, as policy makers and scholars debate whether nuclear deterrence deserves credit as a positive factor in the avoidance of military confrontation between the superpowers during the Cold War years. Cimbala examines several cases of great-power decision making before, during, and after the Cold War to demonstrate that deterrent threats alone have not successfully avoided war during this century. In some important instances, such as the months leading up to World War I, threats have actually fed into a chain of miscalculation that ultimately led to war. Cimbala also considers the Berlin crisis of 1948, the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962, and the Gulf War of 1991, the first major post-Cold War conflict. Military Persuasion makes a significant contribution to war and peace studies, firmly grounded in a realistic appraisal of the human dimension to crisis management. Condition: Good.
Keywords: Nuclear weapons, Deterrence, Diplomacy, Mobilization, Conciliation, Strategic Planning, Military Readiness, Persian Gulf, Schlieffen Plan, Ballistic Missile, Brinkmanship, Command and Control, Cuban Missile Crisis, Crisis Management, Gulf War, Milita
ISBN: 0271010053
[Book #84030]
Price: $100.00