Decision In Germany; A Personal Report on The Four Crucial Years That Set The Course of Future World History [Subtitle from the dust jacket]
Garden City, NY: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1950. First Edition [stated], presumed first printing. Hardcover. 522 pages. Endpaper maps. The dust jacket has some wear, tears, soiling and chips. Lucius Dubignon Clay (23 April 1898 – 16 April 1978) was a senior officer of the United States Army who was known for his administration of occupied Germany after World War II. He served as the deputy to General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower in 1945; deputy military governor, Germany, in 1946; Commander in Chief, United States Forces in Europe and military governor of the United States Zone, Germany, from 1947 to 1949. Clay orchestrated the Berlin Airlift (1948–1949) when the USSR blockaded West Berlin. By March 1942, Clay had risen to the position of being the youngest brigadier general in the army, a month short of his 44th birthday. All the while, he had acquired a reputation for bringing order and operational efficiency out of chaos, and for being an exceptionally hard and disciplined worker. Clay was promoted to lieutenant general on 17 April 1945 and to general on 17 March 1947. Clay heavily influenced US Secretary of State James F. Byrnes' September 1946 speech in Stuttgart, Germany. The speech, "Restatement of Policy on Germany," marked the transition in American occupation policy to one of economic reconstruction. On 15 March 1947, Clay succeeded Joseph T. McNarney as military governor (or "high commissioner") of the US zone of occupied Germany—the head of the "Office of Military Government, United States." Clay's responsibilities covered a wide spectrum of social issues related to Germany's recovery from the war in addition to strictly military issues. Derived from a Kirkus review: This is an important book for the record. [There is] a tremendous amount of competent recording of conferences- the give and take, the progress, the blocking, and so on, for the sections between dealing with the first hand recounting of what happened- and how. Certain important and positive evidence emerges, realizes that our years of military government in Germany- under Clay's four years' administration- were not years of improvisation and expediency, but that the flexibility of the American system, inherently, is applied to this area of administration, as decisions, based on international conference, adjusted to meet circumstances unforeseen, but were not abandoned. The problems were terrific:- problems of organization, of relation between military government and occupation forces, of redeployment, of fraternization and morale, of black market operation and manipulation of currency. He discusses at various points the problems too of deNazification, de-industrialization, reparations, the formation of a new German political structure, of new political parties. And over and above and through it all, was the all-penetrating problem of Russian intransigence- outward friendliness, inward tensions. After the Moscow Conference, pretense was at an end; the principle of bizonal administration was accepted, and steps taken to a new Constitution for Western Germany. Clay traces the steps from chaos to a measure of order, with 1948 a turning point to constructive growth, German responsibility beginning to put down roots of democratic development. E.R.P. and the Marshall Plan saved Western Europe, but Clay honestly expresses his misgivings on some aspects of operation, on the danger that planning will stifle enterprise. One of the most illuminating sections of the book deals with the administrative problems in the U.S. zone- the care of 150,000 Americans living in a disrupted economy, the D.P. problem, the restoration of law and order, the trials. He specifically details his reasons for his decision in the disputed Ilse Koch case. He tells of the progress of deNazification, of food and health programs (and pays tribute to the proportion carried by the German state governments and private welfare organizations). He analyzes some of the program of psychological warfare -- of restoration -- of security. The blockade is given less emphasis than our press gave it- but it has its place in the achievements over odds of the Clay regime. He ends by expressing confidence in the steps taken to restore a functioning Germany as part of the European family of nations. Condition: Good / Fair.
Keywords: Military Occupation, Military Government, Potsdam, Democracy, American Zone, Control Council, Economic Reconstruction, Currency Reform, Restitution, Berlin Blockade, Berlin Airlift, West Germany, Ilse Koch, deNazification, Refugees, Psychological War
[Book #87376]
Price: $75.00