Refine search resultsSkip to search results
Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1986. First Printing [Stated]. Trade paperback. 21 cm. xiv. 197,  pages. Wraps. Illustrations. Footnotes. Endnotes. Selected Bibliography. Index. Slight wear and soiling to covers. Andrew J. Bacevich Jr. (born July 5, 1947) is an American historian specializing in international relations, security studies, American foreign policy, and American diplomatic and military history. He graduated from the United States Military Academy at West Point in 1969 and served in the United States Army during the Vietnam War, serving in Vietnam from the summer of 1970 to the summer of 1971. He taught at West Point and Johns Hopkins University before joining the faculty at Boston University in 1998. He is a Professor Emeritus of International Relations and History at the Boston University Frederick S. Pardee School of Global Studies. He is also a retired career officer in the Armor Branch of the United States Army, retiring with the rank of colonel. He is a former director of Boston University's Center for International Relations (from 1998 to 2005), now part of the Pardee School of Global Studies. Bacevich is the co-founder and president of the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft.
Hurlburt Field, FL: Joint Special Operations University, 2005. Presumed First Edition, First printing. Wraps. v, , 113,  pages. Illustrations. Endnotes. Principles, Axioms & Rules, Acronyms, Definitions, References, Additional Reading. Colonel Joseph D. Celeski, U.S. Army, Retired, provides his thoughts on how we might think about, plan, and conduct operations in the new threat environment of "Terro-Insurgency." In this environment insurgents are joined by various terrorists, drug traffickers, and other criminals to create what he calls the "Gray Stew" mix that confronts us today in Afghanistan and elsewhere. Based on his understanding of the new environment, Colonel Celeski posits a theory of counterinsurgency (COIN) and suggests techniques for developing the COIN plan and executing it employing special operations forces. He reinforces his concepts concerning COIN with a review of the war in Afghanistan.
Chicago, IL: Contemporary Books, 1989. Hardcover. 24 cm. 438 pages. Illustrations. Map. Endpaper maps. Appendices. Chronology. Glossary. Index. Some creasing to DJ edges. William Egan Colby (January 4, 1920 – April 27, 1996) spent a career in intelligence for the United States, culminating in serving as the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) from September 1973 to January 1976. During World War II Colby served with the Office of Strategic Services. After the war he joined the Central Intelligence Agency. During the Vietnam War, Colby served as chief of station in Saigon, chief of the CIA's Far East Division, and head of the Civil Operations and Rural Development effort He oversaw the Phoenix Program. As Director of Central Intelligence, under intense pressure from the United States Congress and the media, adopted a policy of relative openness about U.S. intelligence activities to the Senate Church Committee and House Pike Committee.
Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1986. Presumed First Edition, First printing. Hardcover. xiii, , 417,  pages. Abbreviations. Author Index. Subject Index. Stamp on top edge. Pencil erasure residue on fep. Cover has slight wear and soiling. Born in 1916, Paolo Enrico Coletta graduated from the University of Missouri in 1938 with a B.S. in Education, and undertook graduate studies at the same institution. He completed his Masters degree in 1939, and his Ph.D. in 1942. After serving in the United States Navy during World War II, he taught at the United States Naval Academy as a Professor in the Department of English, History, and Government.