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New York: The Hudson Review, Inc., 1961. 145, wraps, covers soiled, some wear to edges of covers and spine Contains an article translated by Franz Schneider and Charles Gullans on "Last Letters From Stalingrad" (pp. 335-367). These are excerpts of letters written by German troops and flown out of Stalingrad in January 1943; the letters were seized by the Bureau of Army Information and analyzed to ascertain "troop morale." The German Army Press Corps was to use the letters to write a documented account of the Battle of Stalingrad, but the book was suppressed as morale was deemed too low.
Moscow: Gosudarstvennoye Izdatel'stvo Politicheskoy LIteratury, 1958. Hardcover. xv, , 510,  pages, Illustrations. Some page discoloration. Rear board weak and strengthened with glue. This is a collection of Documents, various orders, decisions, letters, verdicts,etc. Name, location, and date in ink on t-p. Title page is in two colors. Stamp on title page.
Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1958. Presumed First Edition/First Printing. Hardcover. 22 cm, 137 pages. Name in ink on flyleaf. Signed by the author. Fascinating read and insight into the times. This was the "new world order" before the one predicated by the collapse of the USSR. Acheson's goal is to persuade his readers to take the Soviet threat seriously, to concentrate power in American hands (given the limits, for example, of the UN), to maintain and strengthen alliances with free states, and to limit one's efforts to what is possible, rather than desirable.
Washington DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2011. Presumed First Edition, First printing. Wraps. vii, , 34,  pages. Oversized volume, measuring 11 inches by 8-12 inches. Minor cover soiling noted. Includes Executive Summary; Introduction; The Value and Objectives of U.S.-Russian Arms Control; The Next Round: Contrasting U.S. and Russian Objectives; A Way Forward; Getting the Process Right; U.S. Nuclear Weapons and Stockpile Management; Conclusions; and Appendix: Warhead Verification. While Russia's primary goal is to curtail U.S. nonnuclear capabilities, in particular ballistic missile defense and conventional prompt global strike, Washington's interests lie with Russian nuclear weapons. Russia's strategic forces remain one of the few truly existential threats faced by the United States. Consequently, it is firmly in the U.S. national interest to try to bolster strategic stability through arms control.